A View from the First Amendment Trenches: Washington State\u27s New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy by Johnson, Bruce E.H. & Duran, Sarah K.
Washington Law Review 
Volume 87 
Number 2 Symposium: The First Amendment in 
the Modern Age 
6-1-2012 
A View from the First Amendment Trenches: Washington State's 
New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy 
Bruce E.H. Johnson 
Sarah K. Duran 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Bruce E. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran, Essay, A View from the First Amendment Trenches: Washington 
State's New Protections for Public Discourse and Democracy, 87 Wash. L. Rev. 495 (2012). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol87/iss2/6 
This Essay is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital Commons. 
It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital Commons. 
For more information, please contact cnyberg@uw.edu. 
11 -- Johnson FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:18 AM 
 
495 
A VIEW FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT TRENCHES: 
WASHINGTON STATE’S NEW PROTECTIONS FOR 
PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRACY 
Bruce E.H. Johnson & Sarah K. Duran* 
Abstract: In his latest book, Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First 
Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State, Dean Robert Post promotes the concept of 
“democratic legitimation” as the cornerstone of democratic decision making. Dean Post 
defines “democratic legitimation” as “all efforts” to influence “public opinion.”1 As Post 
explains, “[d]emocracy requires that government action be tethered to public opinion” 
because “public opinion can direct government action in an endless variety of directions.”2 
As a result, First Amendment coverage should extend to all communications that form public 
opinion, he contends.3 Those who object to speech aimed at influencing public opinion have 
learned they can file a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP). The purpose 
of the SLAPP suit is to impede efforts to influence public opinion by intimidating the speaker 
with expensive and lengthy litigation. Since the late 1980s, states have reacted to SLAPP 
lawsuits by enacting anti-SLAPP statutes. Washington State has had a statute in place since 
1989 that protects speakers from litigation resulting from statements made to government 
officials. In 2010, the Washington legislature expanded those protections by enacting 
Revised Code of Washington 4.24.510, which more broadly protects speakers who comment 
on matters of public concern. This Article reviews Dean Post’s theory of democratic 
legitimation and then looks at statutes across the nation and in Washington that are aimed at 
protecting speakers from litigation that seeks to chill the First Amendment rights of citizens 
who comment on matters of public concern. The Article concludes that Washington’s new 
statute promotes Dean Post’s goal of democratic legitimation. 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article provides observations from two lawyers whose practices 
focus on defending the free speech rights of those citizens whose speech 
comprise “democratic legitimation,” as described by Dean Robert Post 
                                                   
* Mr. Johnson is a partner and Ms. Duran is an associate in the Seattle office of Davis Wright 
Tremaine LLP (DWT). The opinions expressed in this article are the authors’ own, and do not 
necessarily reflect the views of the law firm or its clients. The authors wish to thank the following 
individuals for their assistance with this Article: Ambika Doran, an associate at DWT, who assisted 
with researching and drafting this article, and Bret Masterson, a librarian at DWT, who assisted with 
research. The authors retain the copyright in this article and authorize royalty-free reproduction for 
non-profit purposes, provided any such reproduction contains a customary legal citation to the 
Washington Law Review. 
1. ROBERT C. POST, DEMOCRACY, EXPERTISE, AND ACADEMIC FREEDOM: A FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE FOR THE MODERN STATE 18–19 (2012). 
2. Id. at 19. 
3. Id. at 18–20. 
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in his book Democracy, Expertise, and Academic Freedom: A First 
Amendment Jurisprudence for the Modern State. Post describes 
“democratic legitimation” as necessarily including “all efforts” to 
influence “public opinion.”4 It is a First Amendment doctrine that values 
the opinions of all citizens, a doctrine that Post believes is the 
cornerstone of democratic decision making. As Dean Post explains, 
“[d]emocracy requires that government action be tethered to public 
opinion” because “public opinion can direct government action in an 
endless variety of directions.”5 As a result, First Amendment coverage 
should extend to all communications that form public opinion, he 
contends.6 
The First Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law 
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise 
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right 
of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for 
a redress of grievances.”7 Despite these lofty ideals, as practitioners we 
are all too aware of statutory and common law restrictions on free 
speech.8 Some people use these statutory and common law restrictions 
as weapons to intimidate speakers, by filing baseless lawsuits known as 
Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation (SLAPP).9 The strategy 
is to file weak claims with the goal of silencing speakers because they 
fear the expense and travails of litigation. Ordinary citizens―not to 
                                                   
4. POST, supra note 1, at 18–19. 
5. Id. at 19. 
6. Id. at 18–19. 
7. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
8. For instance, some states still have libel laws on their books that would allow a person to be 
held criminally liable for defamatory speech. See ALA. CODE § 13A-11-160 (LexisNexis 2005); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 836.01–.09 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-11-40 (2011); IDAHO CODE 
ANN. § 18-4801 to -4809 (2004); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 300/1 (West 2010); KY. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 432.280 (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:47 (2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 272, 
§ 98C (LexisNexis 2010); MICH. COMP. LAW ANN. § 750.97 (West 2004); MINN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 609.765 (West 2009); MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-55 (West 2011); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-8-212 
(2011); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.510–.560 (West 2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 644:11 (2007); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-11-1 (LexisNexis 2004); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-47 (2011); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 12.1-15-01 (1997); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2739.03 (LexisNexis 2008); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, 
§§ 771–781 (2002); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-7-150 (2003); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-9-404 (West 
2004): VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-209 (2009); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 942.01 (West 2005). Examples of 
common-law restriction of speech include obscenity, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 483 
(1957); incitement, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447–49, (1969); fighting words, 
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942); and defamation, Milkovich v. Lorain 
Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 11 (1990). 
9. The phrase was first coined by Professors George Pring and Penelope Canan. GEORGE W. 
PRING & PENELOPE CANAN, SLAPPS: GETTING SUED FOR SPEAKING OUT (1996).  
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mention experts and academics―are less likely to participate in or 
contribute to democratic legitimation if they fear their speech will be 
punished or subject to expensive litigation. SLAPP lawsuits are filed to 
discourage people from public discourse on an unlimited variety of 
topics, such as a housing development under consideration in their 
neighborhood, a candidate running for office, or a story that has made 
the news headlines.10 The good news is that Washington State, and 
numerous other states, have recognized the fundamental importance of 
protecting public discourse from SLAPP claims. 
Washington led the nation in 1989 by passing the first anti-SLAPP 
statute, codified at Revised Code of Washington (RCW) 4.24.510.11 The 
statute allows a defendant to bring a motion to defeat the plaintiff’s 
SLAPP claims and to recover fines and attorneys’ fees for the cost of 
defending against the SLAPP claim.12 However, the statute’s protections 
are limited to statements made to government officials in the course of 
government decision making.13 
Recognizing the limitations on Washington’s old statute, the 
Washington Legislature in 2010 enacted RCW 4.24.525, which 
significantly expands protections for the free speech rights of 
individuals, government entities, and others.14 We were involved in 
drafting the law and urging its enactment. The new law has four goals: 
(1) to provide as a matter of substantive law a statutory immunity for 
statements (and expressive conduct) on matters of public concern, where 
the plaintiff is unable to establish a prima facie case supporting his or 
her cause of action; (2) to furnish a suggested procedural framework that 
encourages and facilitates prompt and inexpensive resolution of such 
SLAPP claims; (3) to provide a right of immediate appeal of a trial 
court’s ruling on an anti-SLAPP motion; and (4) to require appropriate 
reimbursement for the targets of SLAPP lawsuits through an award of 
                                                   
10. Id. at 1–8, 30–45, 71–82; see, e.g., Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 44 
Cal. Rptr. 2d 46 (Ct. App. 1995) (news story); Botos v. L.A. Cnty. Bar Ass’n, 199 Cal. Rptr. 236 
(Ct. App. 1984) (candidate for office); Oceanside Enters., Inc. v. Capobianco, 537 N.Y.S.2d 190 
(App. Div. 1989) (housing development). 
11. PRING & CANAN, supra note 9, at 191–92. 
12. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010). 
13. See id. (“A person who communicates a complaint or information to any branch or agency of 
federal, state, or local government, or to any self-regulatory organization that regulates persons 
involved in the securities or futures business and that has been delegated authority by a federal, 
state, or local government agency and is subject to oversight by the delegating agency, is immune 
from civil liability.”). 
14. See id. § 4.24.525. 
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reasonable attorneys’ fees and a $10,000 sanction.15 
In this Article, we offer our experience with anti-SLAPP legislation 
and lawsuits to explain how the law protects public discourse and 
furthers a key First Amendment value. While we agree with Post’s 
warning that it may not be “helpful for constitutional lawyers to venture 
into . . . epistemological thicket[s],”16 constitutional lawyers have 
confronted and addressed the risks to democratic legitimation of a 
fearful citizenry, hesitant “to speak, write, and publish on all subjects”17 
because of the threat of meritless lawsuits. We hope to show where the 
First Amendment rubber meets the road, at least here in the Pacific 
Northwest. To do so, this Article will focus on the anti-SLAPP statute as 
one aspect of lawmaking that protects speakers who contribute to public 
discourse and democratic legitimation. 
This Article is divided into four subsequent parts. Part One reviews 
and analyzes Post’s theory of First Amendment jurisprudence, focusing 
on his theory of democratic legitimation. Part Two considers the state of 
anti-SLAPP statutes nationwide. Part Three explores Washington’s first 
anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.510, and the statute’s limitations for 
protecting public discourse. Part Three also examines Washington’s new 
anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525, and its greater protections for public 
discourse. Finally, Part Four argues that broad anti-SLAPP statutes such 
as RCW 4.24.525 play an important role in Post’s democratic 
legitimation by protecting speakers who contribute to public discourse. 
To safeguard public discourse, and thereby foster democratic 
legitimation, states should follow Washington’s lead by enacting broad 
anti-SLAPP statutes. 
I. POST’S THEORY OF FIRST AMENDMENT 
JURISPRUDENCE: PROTECTING PUBLIC OPINION AND A 
CONFLICT BETWEEN DEMOCRATIC LEGITIMATION AND 
DEMOCRATIC COMPETENCE 
Post defines public discourse as “the forms of communication 
constitutionally deemed necessary for formation of public opinion.”18 
Post notes that a recurring theme in First Amendment doctrine is the 
                                                   
15. See id. 
16. POST, supra note 1, at 7. 
17. WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 5 (“Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, 
being responsible for the abuse of that right.”). 
18. POST, supra note 1, at 15. 
11 -- Johnson FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:18 AM 
2012] A VIEW FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT TRENCHES 499 
 
emphasis on matters of “public concern.”19 Thus, Post reminds us that a 
touchstone of First Amendment coverage is: 
[W]hether communication involves public officials, or public 
figures, or matters of public concern, or is directed to the general 
public, [which] derives from the conviction that, as Learned 
Hand put it, “public opinion . . . is the final source of 
government in a democratic state.” “Public opinion,” said James 
Madison, “is the real sovereign in every free” government. The 
function of the First Amendment is to safeguard the 
communicative processes by which public opinion is formed, so 
as to ensure the integrity of “the great process by which public 
opinion passes over into public will, which is legislation.”20 
In short, the purpose of the First Amendment is “to protect the free 
formation of public opinion that is the sine qua non of democracy.”21 
Post explains that American democracy rests on the value of self-
government, the idea that those who are subject to law should also see 
their own hand in the creation of the law.22 Democracy in the United 
States supports this value by making government decisionmaking 
responsible to public opinion and “guaranteeing to all the possibility of 
influencing public opinion.”23 Allowing people to participate in forming 
public opinion is essential to democratic values: “[I]f persons are 
prevented even from the possibility of seeking to influence the content 
of public opinion, there is little hope of democratic legitimation in a 
modern culturally heterogeneous state.”24 Post explains that 
“[d]emocracy requires that government action be tethered to public 
opinion” because “public opinion can direct government action in an 
endless variety of directions.”25 As a result, First Amendment coverage 
should extend to all communications that form public opinion.26 
Elections are one mechanism that democracies use to subordinate 
government decisionmaking to public opinion.27 Periodic elections are a 
form of “public discourse” but are not the only forum for such 
                                                   
19. Id. at 14. 
20. Id. (second alteration in original) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted). 
21. Id. at 15. 
22. Id. at 17. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. at 18. 
25. Id. at 19. 
26. Id. at 18–19. 
27. Id. at 20. 
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communications, Post argues.28 The larger perspective of the First 
Amendment regards public opinion as constantly in motion.29 
From the constitutional point of view, therefore, public opinion 
does not possess the internal consistency or integrity that is 
characteristic of agents who must decide and act. It is instead 
transactional and subjectless. The object of the First Amendment 
might most precisely be characterized as protecting the open 
processes by which public opinion is constantly formed and 
reformed.30 
Post states that democratic values of freedom of expression depend on 
equality among speakers.31 According to Post, the value of democratic 
legitimation is served by the First Amendment’s protection of the 
autonomy of speakers.32 “If persons within public discourse are 
prevented from choosing what to communicate or not to communicate, 
the value of democratic legitimation will not be served.”33 Thus, Post 
writes: 
First Amendment prohibitions against viewpoint and content 
discrimination express the essential postulate that all persons 
within public discourse should be equally free to say or not say 
what they choose. This equality reflects the premise that in a 
democracy every subject of law possesses an equal right to seek 
to shape the content of public opinion and so to influence 
government action.34 
He stresses that the free speech doctrine advances the “goal of 
democratic legitimation by ensuring that public opinion remains open to 
the subjective engagement of all, even of the idiosyncratic and 
eccentric.”35 
On the one hand, First Amendment jurisprudence allows the state to 
regulate the publication of false facts; but on the other hand, it will 
eschew regulation of ideas, under the belief that “there is no such thing 
as a false idea.”36 Citizens who disagree with official versions of factual 
                                                   
28. Id. at 20–21. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. 
31. Id. at 22. 
32. Id. at 21. 
33. Id. 
34. Id. at 22. 
35. Id. at 28. 
36. Id. at 29 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)). 
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truth, however, are excluded from participating in public opinion.37 
When government intervenes to settle disputes about factual questions, it 
alienates people from participating in public discourse,38 and this is a 
problem because “[a] state that controls our knowledge controls our 
minds.”39 Thus, Post argues, “cognitive empowerment” is essential to a 
democratic society and intelligent self-governance. 
We agree with Post that democratic legitimation is crucial to a 
democratic society and intelligent self-governance. As a practical matter, 
we know that the ideal of democratic legitimation conflicts with the real 
world when the government seeks to regulate the speech of citizens 
through the courts.40 Meanwhile, citizens frequently do not have the 
financial resources to defend themselves from unwarranted litigation. In 
these circumstances, the threat of costly SLAPPs can effectively deter 
the exercise of free expression. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES NATIONWIDE 
Post espouses the theoretical importance of protecting public 
discourse as part of the broader goal of democratic legitimation.41 In 
practice, however, protecting democratic legitimation can be a challenge 
because individuals, companies, and groups have learned that they can 
bring a lawsuit against a speaker in an effort to discourage or prevent 
discourse. The speaker ultimately prevails, but in doing so, he or she 
accrues tens of thousands of dollars in legal bills, and spends countless 
hours consulting with lawyers on building a legal defense.42 Thus, an 
                                                   
37. Id. 
38. Id. at 30. 
39. Id. at 33. 
40. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (stating that Alabama courts may 
enforce an action involving free speech and the press between two private parties). 
41. POST, supra note 4, at 21.  
42. See, e.g., Maple Props. v. Harris, 205 Cal. Rptr. 532 (Ct. App. 1984) (awarding sanctions of 
$20,000 for frivolous litigation in a six-year-long suit by real estate developer against individuals 
that opposed condo development); City of Long Beach v. Bozek, 31 Cal. 3d 527 (1982), vacated 
and remanded, 459 U.S. 1095 (1983), aff’d on other grounds, 661 P.2d 1072 (Cal. 1983) 
(considering suit by city and police officers against an individual for bringing prior suit in which he 
alleged false arrest and police brutality); Patane v. Griffin, 562 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007, 1009 (App. 
Div. 1990) (awarding fees and costs for frivolous litigation in a suit by town supervisor against 
constituents who raised questions about his land dealings); Immuno A.G. v. Moor-Jankowski, 537 
N.Y.S.2d 129, 131 (1989) (deciding five-year-long litigation against activist and editor of medical 
journal that published activist’s letter criticizing drug company for proposed testing on 
chimpanzees); SRW Assocs. v. Bellport Beach Prop. Owners, 517 N.Y.S.2d 741 (1987) 
(considering suit by real estate partnership claiming libel based on alleged misstatements by 
homeowners association during planning board hearing); Searle v. Johnson, 646 P.2d 682 (Utah 
 
11 -- Johnson FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:18 AM 
502 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:495 
 
endorsement for broad anti-SLAPP statutes is an endorsement for 
protecting the free speech rights that are the cornerstone of Post’s 
democratic legitimation. 
Across the country, states have developed different approaches to 
dealing with lawsuits aimed at discouraging public discourse.43 This 
section will look at anti-SLAPP legislation nationwide and describe 
narrow and broad approaches to anti-SLAPP legislation, with the 
conclusion that narrow statutes are inconsistent with free-speech ideals 
because they protect limited types of speech while leaving others 
exposed to meritless lawsuits. 
A. State Anti-SLAPP Statutes Vary, with Some More Protective of 
Speech than Others 
SLAPP lawsuits are civil claims or counterclaims filed against 
individuals or organizations based on their communications to 
government or speech regarding an issue of public interest or concern.44 
Typically, SLAPPs are brought by real estate developers, corporations, 
government entities and officials, and others against individuals and 
community groups who oppose them on an issue of public concern.45 
The plaintiffs often bring civil claims such as defamation, interference 
with contract and economic advantage, malicious prosecution, and 
nuisance.46 The purpose is to chill the defendant’s speech through costly 
and emotionally exhausting litigation.47 Such lawsuits are antithetical to 
public discourse. 
To protect citizens from these SLAPP lawsuits, twenty-eight states as 
well as the District of Columbia and the U.S. Territory of Guam have 
enacted anti-SLAPP laws.48 The statutes provide a mechanism for a 
                                                   
1982), summary judgment order on remand aff’d, 709 P.2d 328 (Utah 1985) (considering suit 
against state humane society and director for promoting boycott of businesses in town to create 
pressure over conditions at local dog pound); Webb v. Fury, 282 S.E.2d 28, 47 (W. Va. 1981) 
(recognizing that the costs of discovery and legal fees “may chill the free exercise of first 
amendment rights” in a suit by coal mine operator against environmental activist, alleging he 
defamed company in reports of alleged violations to the EPA). 
43. See Shannon Hartzler, Note, Protecting Informed Public Participation: Anti-SLAPP Law and 
the Media Defendant, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 1235, 1248–70 (2007). 
44. PRING & CANAN, supra note 9, at 8–9. 
45. Id. at 30, 216. 
46. See, e.g., id. at 3–7. 
47. Id. at 11.  
48. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751 to -752 (Supp. 2011); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 16-63-501 
to -508 (2005); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16 (West 2004); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 8136–
8138 (1999); D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to -5505 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.304(4) (West 
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defendant to file a dispositive motion that requires the plaintiff to come 
forward with evidence showing the claims are viable, and they provide 
an award of attorneys’ fees or other penalties for bringing a meritless 
suit that was aimed at discouraging the plaintiff’s rights to free speech or 
petition.49 The burden-shifting mechanism in these statutes is 
particularly important because it requires the plaintiff to come forward 
early in the case to demonstrate that the claims are viable, and if they are 
not viable, the court must dismiss the claims before the defendant is 
bogged down in expensive litigation.50 For instance, Arizona’s statute 
states that “[t]he court shall grant the motion unless the party against 
whom the motion is made shows that the moving party’s exercise of the 
right of petition did not contain any reasonable factual support or any 
arguable basis in law,” the defendant’s motion should be filed within 
ninety days and the court must “give calendar preference to an action 
brought under this subsection.”51 Similarly, California’s statute provides 
                                                   
2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-11.1 (2006); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 51-5-7(4) (2000); 7 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 17101–17109 (2005); HAW. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 634F-1 to -4 (LexisNexis 2007); 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 110/15 to /25 (West 2011); IND. 
CODE ANN. §§ 34-7-7-1 to -10 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. art. 971 (2005); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 556 (2003); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 5-807 (LexisNexis 
2006); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 231, § 59H (LexisNexis 2009); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 554.01–.05 
(West 2010); MO. ANN. STAT. § 537.528 (West 2008); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-21,241–,246 
(LexisNexis 2004); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.637, .650–.670 (2012); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 38-2-9.1 
(Supp. 2011); N.Y. CIV. RIGHTS LAW §§ 70-a, 76-a (McKinney 2009); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 3211(g) 
(McKinney Supp. 2012); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1443.1 (West 2010); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. 
§§ 31.150–.155 (West Supp. 2011); 27 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 7707, 8301–8303 (West 2009); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 9-33-1 to -4 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-21-1001 to -1004 (2011); TEX. CIV. 
PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West Supp. 2011); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78B-6-1401 to 
-1405 (West 2009 & Supp. 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 1041 (2012); WASH. REV. CODE 
§§ 4.24.510–.525 (2010). In addition, the Michigan and North Carolina legislatures and the U.S. 
Congress in recent legislative sessions introduced anti-SLAPP bills although none has become law. 
See Citizen Participation Act of 2009, H.R. 4364, 111th Cong. (2009); H.B. 5036, 95th Leg., Reg. 
Sess. (Mich. 2009); Citizen Participation Act, H.B. DRH30241-MH-45, 2011 Gen. Assemb. of N.C. 
(N.C. 2011). In addition, although Colorado, Connecticut, and West Virginia do not have anti-
SLAPP statutes, the courts in those states have recognized a common law defense to lawsuits that 
retaliate against efforts by citizens to petition the government. See Krystkowiak v. W.O. Brisben 
Cos., 90 P.3d 859, 862 (Colo. 2004) (holding that a First Amendment defense to a retaliatory 
lawsuit be handled as a motion for summary judgment), reaffirming Protect Our Mountain Env’t, 
Inc. v. Dist. Court, 677 P.2d 1361 (Colo. 1984); Royce v. Willowbrook Cemetery, Inc., No. 
XO8CV010185694, 2003 WL 431909 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 3, 2003) (recognizing that a plaintiff’s 
objectively baseless defamation suit could violate the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act); 
Harris v. Adkins, 432 S.E.2d 549, 552 (W. Va. 1993) (concluding that because the defendant’s 
speech involved the exercise of the right to petition, his statements were absolutely protected). 
49. See statutes cited supra note 48; see also PRING & CANAN, supra note 9, at 188–207; 
Hartzler, supra note 43, at 1242. 
50. See Hartzler, supra note 43, at 1242. 
51. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-752(A)–(C). 
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that a plaintiff’s claim will be dismissed unless “the plaintiff has 
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the 
claim,” the special motion to strike should be filed within sixty days of 
the service of the complaint, and should be heard no more than thirty 
days after the motion is served.52 
Some anti-SLAPP statutes are narrow in that they protect only 
statements made to government authorities. For instance, Arizona’s anti-
SLAPP statute protects (1) written or oral statements that are made as 
part of an initiative, referendum or recall effort, and (2) written or oral 
statements submitted to a governmental body, made in connection with 
an issue that is under consideration or review by a legislative or 
executive body or any other governmental proceeding and made for the 
purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision, or result.53 
Florida’s statute prevents governmental entities from filing SLAPP suits 
and prohibits SLAPP suits regarding comments made by, to, or 
regarding homeowners’ associations.54 
In contrast, California’s anti-SLAPP statute is one of the broadest 
anti-SLAPP statutes in effect in the United States. The statute protects 
any act of a person in furtherance of that person’s right to petition or free 
speech “in connection with a public issue.”55 An “act in furtherance” of 
the right to petition includes: 
[A]ny written or oral statement or writing made in a place open 
to the public or a public forum in connection with an issue of 
public interest; . . . or any other conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the 
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public 
issue or an issue of public interest.56 
Arkansas’s anti-SLAPP statute protects slightly less conduct than 
                                                   
52. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1), (f). 
53. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-751. The statute is similar to Washington’s RCW 4.24.510. See 
infra Part III. 
54. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.304 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2011). The 
Florida statute is curious because it acknowledges the increase in SLAPP suits filed by private 
companies and individuals, but explains that “it is the public policy of this state that government 
entities not engage in SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the right of 
individuals to participate in the state’s institutions of government.” § 768.295(2). The Legislature 
declared that prohibiting SLAPP lawsuits by governmental entities preserves the state policy and the 
constitutional rights of Florida citizens. Id. There is no explanation as to why lawmakers chose to 
limit the statute’s reach to government entities, while ignoring the stated problem of lawsuits by 
companies and individuals. 
55. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1). 
56. Id. § 425.16(e). 
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California’s. In order to qualify for protection under the statute, the 
statement must either (1) be made before or to a legislative, executive, or 
judicial proceeding, or other official proceeding; or (2) be in connection 
with an issue under consideration or review by a legislative, executive, 
or judicial body or other official government body.57 Additionally, the 
statement must not be made with the knowledge that it was false or with 
reckless disregard of its falsity.58 Despite these limitations, the statute is 
arguably broad because the legislature specifically stated that the 
definition of protected conduct was not limited to what was delineated 
by the statute.59 
B. The District of Columbia and Texas Have Enacted the Two Most 
Recent Anti-SLAPP Statutes 
Washington State has not been alone in passing anti-SLAPP laws in 
the past two years. After Washington, the District of Columbia and 
Texas have passed the two most recent anti-SLAPP laws. The District of 
Columbia’s statute went into effect on March 31, 2011.60 The statute 
applies to suits based on written or oral statements regarding an issue 
being considered by a governmental body, governmental or official 
proceedings, or issues of public interest made in a public forum.61 It also 
applies to suits concerning any expressive conduct involving petitioning 
the government or communicating with the public regarding issues of 
public interest.62 Certain commercial statements are specifically outside 
the protections of the statute.63 The statute provides for an award of “the 
costs of litigation, including reasonable attorneys’ fees” to a defendant 
who prevails in part or in whole.64 
The D.C. anti-SLAPP statute has already been used in a high-profile 
case involving a defamation lawsuit brought by Washington Redskins 
owner Daniel Snyder against the Washington City Paper.65 Snyder 
                                                   
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-63-503(1) (2005). 
58. Id. § 16-53-504. 
59. “‘An act in furtherance of the right of free speech or the right to petition government for a 
redress of grievances under the United States Constitution or the Arkansas Constitution in 
connection with an issue of public interest or concern’ includes, but is not limited to, any written or 
oral statement, writing, or petition made . . . .” § 16-53-503(1) (emphasis added). 
60. D.C. CODE §§ 16-5501 to -5505 (Supp. 2011). 
61. Id. § 16-5501. 
62. Id. 
63. Id. § 16-5505. 
64. Id. § 16-5504(a). 
65. Paul Farhi, Redskins Owner Daniel Snyder Drops Lawsuit Against Washington City Paper, 
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objected to a story the newspaper ran entitled The Cranky Redskins 
Fans’ Guide to Dan Snyder, which criticized Snyder’s tenure as owner 
of the Washington Redskins and included an encyclopedic listing of his 
missteps and public-relations problems.66 Snyder’s lawsuit sought $1 
million in general damages as well as unspecified punitive damages.67 
Washington City Paper responded by filing an anti-SLAPP motion to 
dismiss based on the new law.68 Before the motion was resolved, Snyder 
dropped his suit.69 
Another recent anti-SLAPP statute is the Texas Citizens Participation 
Act, passed in 2011.70 The law protects acts and communications in 
connection with the rights of association, petition, or free speech.71 The 
statute broadly defines these protected rights. For instance, “right of 
association” refers to people collectively “express[ing], promot[ing], 
pursu[ing], or defend[ing] common interests.”72 Similarly, “right of free 
speech” is defined as communications related to “a matter of public 
concern.”73 “Right to petition” refers to a wide range of activities, 
including those relating to governmental proceedings or issues being 
considered by governmental bodies.74 A motion to dismiss may be filed, 
and discovery may be suspended until the court rules on the motion.75 If 
a defendant shows that the legal action relates to the rights of free 
speech, petition, or association, a court must dismiss the legal action 
unless the plaintiff shows by “clear and specific evidence” a prima facie 
case for each element of the legal claim.76 
Because the statutes have just gone into effect, it is too soon to say 
how broadly the courts will interpret them. But standing alone, the 
statutes provide important broad protections for speech that did not 
previously exist in the District of Columbia and Texas. 
                                                   




68. Paul Farhi, City Paper Fires Back at Snyder, WASH. POST, June 18, 2011, at C1. 
69. Farhi, supra note 65. 
70. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 27.001–.011 (West Supp. 2011). 
71. Id. § 27.003.  
72. Id. § 27.001(2). 
73. Id. § 27.001(3). 
74. Id. § 27.001(4). 
75. Id. § 27.003. 
76. Id. § 27.005(b), (c). Because the plaintiff must come forward with clear and convincing 
evidence to withstand the defendant’s motion, the statute is similar to Washington State’s newly 
enacted anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525, which also requires clear and convincing evidence. 
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C. Narrow Anti-SLAPP Statutes Are Inconsistent with Democratic 
Legitimation 
A review of the types of speech protected by narrow statutes as 
compared with speech protected by broad statutes demonstrates why the 
former do little to protect public discourse. Narrow statutes give 
preference to one type of speech over another and therefore are limited 
in their ability to protect public discourse. In Arizona, for instance, that 
state’s anti-SLAPP statute protects only (1) written or oral statements 
that are made as part of an initiative, referendum, or recall effort; or (2) 
written or oral statements that are submitted to a governmental body, 
made in connection with an issue that is under consideration or review 
by a legislative or executive body or any other governmental proceeding 
and made for the purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision, 
or result.77 As discussed previously, a key problem with the Arizona law 
is that the statement must be made to a government body to receive the 
qualified immunity of an anti-SLAPP statute. Consequently, a statement 
made to the general public would not be protected by the statute, even if 
the speakers were addressing the exact same issue. Thus, for instance, 
citizens who go to a Senate committee hearing to directly communicate 
with lawmakers are protected by the Arizona anti-SLAPP statute, and if 
citizens are sued, they may file a motion pursuant to § 12-751.78 
Subsequently, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a prima facie 
case, and the motion must be heard quickly.79 But if the same citizen 
writes a guest editorial for a newspaper about the same issue and with 
the same goal of influencing lawmaking, the citizen is fully exposed to 
meritless litigation for the statements made in the newspaper and cannot 
invoke Arizona’s anti-SLAPP statute.80 The statements might be exactly 
the same; the only difference is that one is made directly to the state 
                                                   
77. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-751, -752 (Supp. 2011). The statute protects “the right of 
petition,” which is defined as: 
[A]ny written or oral statement that falls within the constitutional protection of free speech and 
that is made as part of an initiative, referendum or recall effort or that is all of the following: 
(a) Made before or submitted to a legislative or executive body or any other governmental 
proceeding. 
(b) Made in connection with an issue that is under consideration or review by a legislative or 
executive body or any other governmental proceeding. 
(c) Made for the purpose of influencing a governmental action, decision or result. 
Id. § 12-751 (emphasis added). The statute is similar to Washington’s RCW 4.24.510. See infra Part 
III. 
78. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
79. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
80. See supra note 53 and accompanying text. 
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legislature while the second speaks to the public at large. There is no 
justification for the speech to be treated differently. 
Similarly, Florida’s statute prevents governmental entities from filing 
SLAPP suits and prohibits SLAPP suits regarding comments made by, 
to, or regarding homeowner’s associations.81 Consequently, only those 
who speak out against governmental entities or homeowners’ 
associations are protected.82 Although the Florida statute protects the 
public from government SLAPP suits, that state’s citizens who wish to 
contribute to public discourse, particularly in matters unrelated to 
homeowners associations, remain exposed to expensive, meritless 
litigation.83 The legislatures in Arizona and Florida have made a 
judgment that values and protects one citizen’s speech over another’s 
speech.84 Under the anti-SLAPP statutes of these two states, individuals 
are not equally free to shape the content of public opinion. To that 
extent, Arizona and Florida’s anti-SLAPP statutes are inconsistent with 
Dean Post’s idea of democratic legitimation: “If persons within public 
discourse are prevented from choosing what to communicate or not to 
communicate, the value of democratic legitimation will not be served.”85 
In Washington, D.C., by contrast, the speech does not need to be 
directed to lawmakers, as in Arizona, or relate to a specific subject like 
homeowners associations to receive protection, as in Florida. Case in 
point, the Washington, D.C. anti-SLAPP statute was successfully 
invoked in the lawsuit by Washington Redskins owner Daniel Snyder 
against the Washington City Paper.86 The newspaper’s statements about 
Snyder were not addressed to a government entity, but to the public in 
general. These statements would not have been protected by an anti-
SLAPP statute if they were made in Arizona or Florida. The D.C. anti-
SLAPP statute required Snyder to come forward early in his case with 
                                                   
81. See FLA. STAT. ANN. § 720.304 (West 2010); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.295 (West 2011). The 
Florida statute is curious because it acknowledges the increase in SLAPP suits filed by private 
companies and individuals, but explains that “it is the public policy of this state that government 
entities not engage in SLAPP suits because such actions are inconsistent with the right of 
individuals to participate in the state’s institutions of government.” § 768.295(2). The Legislature 
declared that prohibiting SLAPP lawsuits by governmental entities preserves the state policy and the 
constitutional rights of Florida citizens. Id. There is no explanation as to why lawmakers chose to 
limit the statute’s reach to government entities, while ignoring the stated problem of lawsuits by 
companies and individuals. 
82. §§ 720.304, 768.295. 
83. See §§ 720.304, 768.295. 
84. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §12-751 (Supp. 2011); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 720.304, 768.295. 
85. POST, supra note 4, at 21. 
86. Farhi, supra note 65. 
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evidence to show the lawsuit had merit. Rather than meet his burden, 
Snyder dismissed his suit.87 
III. WASHINGTON STATE’S TWO ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES: 
FROM NARROW PROTECTIONS FOR SPEECH TO BROAD 
PROTECTIONS 
Washington State now has both a narrow and a broad statute. One law 
protects communications made directly to government officials, which is 
useful but limited in its ability to protect speech. The second law 
protects statements on matters of public concern, which is the “sine qua 
non of democracy.”88 Enacted in 1989, Washington’s initial anti-SLAPP 
law protects only speech made to lawmakers and government officials.89 
Over time, commentators advocated that more protections were 
needed,90 and as a result, lawmakers enacted RCW 4.24.525, which is 
aimed at protecting speech made to the general public that relates to a 
matter of public concern.91 This section will look at the first anti-SLAPP 
statute, its limitations, and the more recently enacted RCW 4.24.525. 
A. An Overview of Washington’s 1989 Anti-SLAPP Law: Text and 
History 
As it is currently codified, RCW 4.24.510 protects “a person” who 
files a complaint or provides information to federal, state, or local 
government or those involved in the regulation of securities or futures 
businesses.92 For immunity to apply, the statement must be a “matter 
reasonably of concern” to the agency or government authority that 
received the communication.93 If defendants prevail, they can recover 
expenses and reasonable attorneys’ fees for defending against the 
                                                   
87. See id. 
88. POST, supra note 4, at 15. 
89. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010). 
90. See, e.g., PRING & CANAN, supra note 9, at 192–93; Michael Eric Johnston, A Better SLAPP 
Trap: Washington State’s Enhanced Statutory Protection for Targets of “Strategic Lawsuits Against 
Public Participation,” 38 GONZ. L. REV. 263, 285–88 (2003); Shawn Newman & Hugh McGavik, 
State Anti-SLAPP Needs Overhaul, TRIAL NEWS, Feb. 2007, at 9; see generally Hartzler, supra note 
43 (analyzing different anti-SLAPP statutes and recommending more broad protections). 
91. See Washington Act Limiting Strategic Lawsuits Against Public Participation, ch. 118, 2010 
Wash. Sess. Laws 921, 921–24. 
92.  WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510. 
93. Id.; see also Valdez-Zontek v. Eastmont Sch. Dist., 154 Wash. App. 147, 167, 225 P.3d 229, 
349–50 (2010) (citing Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue, 120 Wash. App. 365, 372, 85 P.3d 926, 930 
(2004)) (“The statute protects solely communications of reasonable concern to the agency.”) . 
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lawsuit, as well as a statutory award of $10,000.94 However, the statutory 
award may be denied if a court finds that the statement made to 
governmental authorities was communicated in bad faith.95 
RCW 4.24.510 provides immunity from any type of tort claim so long 
as the claim has as its “starting point” or “foundation” statements 
communicated to a governmental agency.96 The statute has been used to 
defend successfully against claims of defamation;97 tortious interference 
with a business expectancy, retaliation for the exercise of another’s First 
Amendment rights, wrongful discharge, and intentional infliction of 
emotional distress;98 invasion of privacy and false light;99 and false 
arrest, false imprisonment, and deprivation of civil rights.100 
The purpose of RCW 4.24.510 is to encourage the reporting of 
information by citizens regarding potential wrongdoing because such 
reports are “vital to effective law enforcement and the efficient operation 
of government.”101 The purpose reflects the legislature’s concern that the 
threat of costly lawsuits can deter citizens who choose to make good-
faith reports to government authorities.102 
Lawmakers were motivated to pass RCW 4.24.510 by a legal battle 
between Brenda Hill, a Vancouver, Washington, mother, against the 
Robert John Real Estate Co. (“Robert John”).103 In refinancing her 
home, Mrs. Hill discovered that the county had no record that she and 
her husband bought their property because Robert John failed to pay 
                                                   
94. § 4.24.510; see also Segaline v. State, 169 Wash. 2d 467, 480–81, 238 P.3d 1107, 1114 
(2010) (Madsen, C.J., concurring); Bailey v. State, 147 Wash. App. 251, 264, 191 P.3d 1285, 1291–
92 (2008) (awarding statutory damages in the amount of $10,000 to a defendant who prevailed on 
an anti-SLAPP motion based on RCW 4.24.510).  
95. § 4.24.510, quoted in Segaline, 169 Wash. 2d at 480–81, 238 P.3d at 1114. 
96. Dang v. Ehredt, 95 Wash. App. 670, 682, 685, 977 P.2d 29, 36, 38 (1999). 
97. E.g., Gilman v. MacDonald, 74 Wash. App. 733, 875 P.2d 697 (1994). 
98. Bailey, 147 Wash. App. at 254–55, 191 P.3d at 1287. 
99. Harris v. City of Seattle, 302 F. Supp. 2d 1200, 1203–04 (W.D. Wash. 2004). 
100. See Dang, 95 Wash. App. at 686, 977 P.2d at 38. 
101. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.500 (2010); see also Valdez-Zontek v. Eastmont Sch. Dist., 154 
Wash. App. 147, 167, 225 P.3d 339, 350 (2010) (“The purpose of the statute is to protect citizens 
who provide information to government agencies by providing a defense for retaliatory lawsuits.”); 
Bailey, 147 Wash. App. at 260, 191 P.3d at 1290 (“RCW 4.24.500 articulates a policy to protect 
citizens who come forward with information that will help make law enforcement and government 
more efficient and more effective. The term ‘efficient operation of government’ is particularly 
broad.”); Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue, 120 Wash. App. 365, 366, 85 P.3d 926, 927 (2004). 
102.  § 4.24.500. 
103. Roberta Ulrich, Bill Giving Protection to ‘Whistle Blowers’ Nears OK by Panel, 
OREGONIAN, Jan. 17, 1989, at B3; Larry Werner, Real Estate Company Sues Homeowner After She 
Tells State About Back Taxes, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, Mar. 10, 1988, at A1. 
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excise tax on the sale.104 After she contacted more than 100 other Robert 
John buyers about possible unpaid taxes and notified the state Revenue 
Department, Robert John filed a defamation lawsuit against the Hills 
seeking $100,000 in damages and initiated a forfeiture on the family’s 
real estate contract.105 The Hills were forced to file for bankruptcy to 
protect their home.106 In 1993, after a six-year legal battle, a jury found 
Brenda Hill not liable for defaming Robert John.107 
In 2002, lawmakers made three important changes to the statute. First, 
they eliminated a requirement that the communication be made in good 
faith; the law as it was passed originally by lawmakers in 1989 granted 
immunity only if the communication was made in good faith.108 The 
Legislature explained that the change would bring Washington’s law “in 
line with . . . court decisions which recognize that the United States 
Constitution protects advocacy to government, regardless of content or 
motive, so long as it is designed to have some effect on government 
decision making.”109 By removing the good-faith requirement, the 
statute now provides absolute immunity for speech that is covered by the 
statute.110 Bad faith does not deny the speaker immunity; it merely 
prevents him or her from receiving the $10,000 statutory penalty.111 
Second, lawmakers added language explaining the intent of the statute: 
to protect against intimidation of those who exercise their First 
Amendment rights112 and free speech rights113 under the Washington 
                                                   
104. Werner, supra note 103, at A10. 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Shirleen Holt, Whistle-Blower Breathes Sigh of Relief, OREGONIAN, Mar. 15, 1993, at B2. 
108. Act of March 28, 2002, ch. 232, 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057; Bailey v. State, 147 Wash. 
App. 251, 261, 191 P.3d 1287, 1290 (2008); Segaline v. State, 144 Wash. App. 312, 325, 182 P.3d 
480, 487 (2008), overruled by 169 Wash. 2d 467, 238 P.3d 1107 (2010). RCW 4.24.510 originally 
provided: “A person who in good faith communicates a complaint or information to any agency of 
federal, state, or local government regarding any matter reasonably of concern to that agency shall 
be immune from civil liability on claims based upon the communication to the agency.” 2002 Wash. 
Sess. Laws 1057.  
109. 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057; Bailey, 147 Wash. App. at 262, 191 P.3d at 1291. 
110. See Kauzlarich v. Yarbrough, 105 Wash. App. 632, 641, 20 P.3d 946, 951 (2001) (noting 
that an absolute immunity absolves a defendant of all liability for defamatory statements while a 
qualified privilege can be lost if it is abused but declining to rule on whether RCW 4.24.510 
provides absolute immunity). 
111. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.510 (2010). 
112. “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free 
exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.” U.S. CONST. 
amend. I. 
113. “Every person may freely speak, write and publish on all subjects, being responsible for the 
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State Constitution.114 Chief Justice Barbara Madsen has noted that with 
this language, “for the first time, the legislature expressly recognized the 
constitutional threat that SLAPP litigation poses.”115 Third, the $10,000 
statutory penalty was added as another deterrent to filing a SLAPP 
suit.116 
B. Gilman v. MacDonald and Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. 
Connells Prairie Community Council Show the Limitations of RCW 
4.24.510 
RCW 4.24.510 has been used sparingly since its 1989 passage. 
Gilman v. MacDonald,117 which was decided before the legislature 
removed the good-faith requirement, exemplifies a rare successful use of 
the anti-SLAPP statute. There, a developer brought a defamation action 
against homeowners A.P. and Denise MacDonald based on letters the 
couple wrote to public officials and others claiming that the developer 
had illegally cleared land within a development.118 The developer filed a 
complaint for defamation, commercial disparagement, and intentional 
interference with business relationships against the homeowners. The 
MacDonalds sought summary judgment on the basis that their 
statements were qualifiedly privileged and the developer’s lawsuit was 
barred by RCW 4.24.510 because their statements were good-faith 
communications of matters of concern to a governmental agency.119 The 
King County Superior Court granted the MacDonalds’ summary 
judgment on some of the plaintiff’s claims, and reserved the issue of 
attorneys’ fees for trial.120 Some claims remained, however, including 
statements made by the MacDonalds in a letter to the Issaquah Press.121 
After the developer took a voluntary nonsuit on the surviving claims, the 
MacDonalds appealed the denial of their request for attorney fees. 
The Court of Appeals held that the trial court erred by applying a 
negligence standard that placed the burden of showing good faith on the 
                                                   
abuse of that right.” WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 5. 
114. 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057. 
115. Segaline v. State, 169 Wash. 2d 467, 480, 238 P.3d 1107, 1114 (2010). 
116. See 2002 Wash. Sess. Laws 1057.  
117. 74 Wash. App. 733, 875 P.2d 697 (1994). 
118. Id. at 735, 875 P.2d at 698. 
119. Id. at 736, 875 P.2d at 698. 
120. Id., 875 P.2d at 699. 
121. Id. at 699 n.4. 
11 -- Johnson FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:18 AM 
2012] A VIEW FROM THE FIRST AMENDMENT TRENCHES 513 
 
defendant in order to justify an attorneys’ fee award.122 The court 
explained the proper standard: The burden is on the plaintiff “to show by 
clear and convincing evidence that the defendant did not act in good 
faith. That is, the defamed party must show, by clear and convincing 
evidence, that the defendant knew of the falsity of the communications 
or acted with reckless disregard as to their falsity.”123 The court 
concluded that the record failed to show clear and convincing evidence 
that A.P. MacDonald acted with knowledge of the falsity of his 
statements to the county officials or with reckless disregard as to their 
falsity.124 The court acknowledged that MacDonald could have 
conducted additional investigation before he made his statements, but 
the failure to do so did not show a lack of good faith.125 The case was 
remanded to the trial court for a determination of attorneys’ fees to be 
awarded to the MacDonalds.126 
Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Community 
Council,127 which was based on the version of the statute before the 
legislature removed the good-faith requirement, also arose from a 
dispute with a real estate developer and demonstrates several 
weaknesses in the statute.128 There, the developer sued two citizen 
groups that opposed the developer’s proposed subdivisions, alleging 
slander, commercial disparagement, tortious interference, and civil 
conspiracy.129 While the defendants’ summary judgment motions were 
pending, the trial court issued a discovery order requiring the citizen 
groups to produce documents for in camera review including 
membership lists, financial records, meetings minutes, petitions, and 
correspondence.130 The citizen groups filed an emergency motion with 
the Washington State Supreme Court seeking a stay of the trial court’s 
order.131 The citizens argued that the developer’s discovery demands 
violated their constitutional rights.132 The Court transferred the case to 
the Court of Appeals, which then granted discretionary review on the 
                                                   
122. Id. at 737–38, 875 P.2d at 699. 
123. Id. at 738–39, 875 P.2d at 700. 
124. Id. at 739, 875 P.2d at 700. 
125. Id. at 740, 875 P.2d at 701. 
126. Id. 
127. 146 Wash. 2d 370, 46 P.3d 789 (2002). 
128. Id. at 374, 46 P.3d at 792. 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 375, 46 P.3d at 792. 
131. Id. at 375–76, 46 P.3d at 792. 
132. Id. 
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discovery dispute and reversed the trial court’s discovery order.133 
However, the appeals court refused to review whether the trial court 
erred by denying the citizen groups’ motion to dismiss and continuing 
their summary judgment motion on the basis that the issues were not 
designated in the defendant’s notice for discretionary review.134 On 
appeal, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the appeals court 
should have reviewed the denial of the groups’ motion to dismiss, 
although the trial court’s order continuing the defendants’ motion for 
summary judgment was not reviewable.135 The Court further held that 
the developer failed to establish a prima facie case of defamation136 for 
statements made at a Pierce County Council meeting: “Right-Price 
produced a videotape of comments made by group members before the 
Pierce County Council, but did not identify any alleged defamatory 
statements.”137 Moreover, relying on MacDonald, the Court stated that 
even if the developer had pointed to any defamatory statements, the 
citizens’ groups were entitled to immunity because the developer failed 
to come forward with clear and convincing evidence that the groups’ 
statements were made with actual malice.138 Finally, the Court ruled that 
the citizen groups were entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees but denied 
their request for sanctions under Civil Rule 11139 or Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 18.9.140 
Gilman and Right-Price Recreation demonstrate several shortcomings 
                                                   
133. Right-Price Recreation, LLC v. Connells Prairie Cmty. Council, 105 Wash. App. 813, 816, 
21 P.3d 1157, 1159 (2001). 
134. Id. at 821, 21 P.3d at 1162. 
135. Right-Price Recreation, 146 Wash. 2d at 380–81, 46 P.3d at 795. 
136. Id. at 384, 46 P.3d at 796. 
137. Id. 
138. Id. 
139. Civil Rule 11(a) provides:  
If a pleading, motion, or legal memorandum is signed in violation of this rule, the court, upon 
motion or upon its own initiative, may impose upon the person who signed it, a represented 
party, or both, an appropriate sanction, which may include an order to pay to the other party or 
parties the amount of the reasonable expenses incurred because of the filing of the pleading, 
motion, or legal memorandum, including a reasonable attorney fee. 
WASH. SUPER. CT. C.R. 11(a). 
140. Right-Price Recreation, 146 Wash. 2d at 384–85, 46 P.3d at 797. Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 18.9 provides:  
The appellate court on its own initiative or on motion of a party may order a party or counsel, 
or a court reporter or other authorized person preparing a verbatim report of proceedings, who 
uses these rules for the purpose of delay, files a frivolous appeal, or fails to comply with these 
rules to pay terms or compensatory damages to any other party who has been harmed by the 
delay or the failure to comply or to pay sanctions to the court. 
WASH. CT. R.A.P. 18.9. 
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in RCW 4.24.510 that exist to this day. First, the inability to invoke 
immunity for speech that is not made to government authorities is a 
significant weakness. In Gilman, for instance, the developer’s claims 
against statements made to the Issaquah Press survived the 
MacDonalds’ summary judgment motion.141 Second, the statute allows 
meritless claims to proceed on their regular trial schedule. Third, the 
statute places no suggested limits on discovery, even after the defendant 
challenges the viability of the plaintiff’s claims—if the parties have not 
conducted any discovery or have just begun to do so, a plaintiff can 
reasonably argue under Civil Rule 56(f)142 for a continuance on the 
defendant’s motion to allow for depositions or other discovery. Thus, in 
Right-Price Recreation, the defendants became embroiled in a protracted 
discovery dispute, even though the plaintiffs ultimately could not make a 
prima facie showing of a defamation claim.143 Fourth, the statute also 
lacks an expedited dismissal procedure at the appellate level. 
The result is that a lawsuit based on statements immune under RCW 
4.24.510 may take years to resolve. In Gilman, the developer’s lawsuit 
was filed in July 1991, and it was not until July 1994 that the appeals 
court handed down a decision that ordered additional action by the 
Superior Court.144 In Right-Price Recreation, the lawsuit was filed in 
April 1999, and the Supreme Court handed down its decision on May 
16, 2002.145 In both cases, it took the citizens more than three years of 
costly litigation to successfully fight off the developers’ lawsuits. 
Furthermore, the right to appeal was not automatic; the defendants in 
Right-Price Recreation had to seek approval for review.146 The time 
spent arguing the right to appeal adds more unnecessary legal costs to 
the defendant’s legal bill. 
                                                   
141. Gilman v. McDonald, 74 Wash. App. 733, 758, 875 P.2d 697, 713 (1994); see also In re 
Schafer, 149 Wash. 2d 148, 167–68, 66 P.3d 1036, 1045 (2003) (stating that whistle-blower reports 
made to the media are not protected by RCW 4.24.510); Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wash. App. 748, 
82 P.3d 707 (2004) (holding RCW 4.24.510 inapplicable where the allegedly defamatory comments 
were made to a newspaper rather than a public officer). 
142. The rule provides:  
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot, for reasons 
stated, present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the 
application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or 
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just. 
WASH. SUPER. CT. C.R. 56(f). 
143. Right-Price Recreation, 146 Wash. 2d at 384, 46 P.3d at 796. 
144. Gilman, 74 Wash. App. at 736, 875 P.2d at 698. 
145. Right-Price Recreation, 146 Wash. 2d at 374, 46 P.3d at 792. 
146. Id. at 376, 46 P.3d at 792. 
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C. The Washington State Supreme Court Has Ruled that Governments 
Cannot Invoke RCW 4.24.510 
In 2010, the statute’s scope narrowed even more when the 
Washington State Supreme Court held in Segaline v. State147 that RCW 
4.24.510 does not provide immunity to government entities because a 
government agency is not a “person” under RCW 4.24.510.148 In that 
case, an electrical contractor filed a lawsuit against the Washington 
Department of Labor and Industries (“L&I”) and an L&I employee, 
alleging negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
malicious prosecution, negligent supervision, and a civil rights violation 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.149 The trial court dismissed all his claims, ruling 
that RCW 4.24.510 gave L&I immunity from most of the plaintiff’s 
claims; his negligent infliction of emotional distress claim was legally 
inadequate; and his § 1983 claim was untimely.150 The Court of Appeals 
affirmed.151 
On appeal, the Washington State Supreme Court defined the narrow 
issue as “whether a government agency that reports information to 
another government agency is a ‘person’ under RCW 4.24.510.”152 The 
Court concluded that a government agency is not a “person”: 
The purpose of the statute is to protect the exercise of 
individuals’ First Amendment rights under the United States 
Constitution and rights under article I, section 5 of the 
Washington State Constitution. A government agency does not 
have free speech rights. It makes little sense to interpret 
“person” here so that an immunity, which the legislature enacted 
to protect one’s free speech rights, extends to a government 
agency that has no such rights to protect. L & I is not privy to 
the RCW 4.24.510 immunity.153 
The Court’s ruling essentially overruled an earlier court of appeals 
holding in Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue154 that the City of Bellevue 
                                                   
147. 169 Wash. 2d 467, 238 P.3d 1107 (2010). 
148. Id. at 473, 238 P.3d at 1110. 
149. Id. at 472, 238 P.3d at 1109. 
150. Id., 238 P.3d at 1109–10. 
151. Segaline v. State, 144 Wash. App. 312, 182 P.3d 480 (2008), overruled by Segaline, 169 
Wash. 2d 467, 238 P.3d 1107. 
152. Segaline, 169 Wash. 2d at 473, 238 P.3d at 1110. 
153. Id. (citation omitted). 
154. 120 Wash. App. 365, 85 P.3d 926 (2004). 
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was a “person” under RCW 4.24.510.155 
D. Criticisms of RCW 4.24.510 Prompted the Washington Legislature 
to Pass RCW 4.24.525 
Commentators noted the problems with RCW 4.24.510 and the 
restricted opportunity for citizens to invoke the anti-SLAPP statute.156 In 
2007, for instance, two attorneys, Shawn Newman and Hugh McGavick, 
wrote an article for the Washington State Trial Lawyers Association 
magazine urging a number of changes to the law.157 The authors 
suggested eliminating the good-faith requirement to obtain the statutory 
fine because a dispute over good faith–bad faith could result in costly 
discovery and litigation on that issue alone.158 They argued that the 
statute should be amended to allow dispositive motions to be brought 
and heard on an expedited procedure.159 They suggested that when 
defendants prevail, each plaintiff should be liable for fines and 
attorneys’ fees, and any award should be per defendant.160 Newman and 
McGavick also urged lawmakers to broaden the statute so that 
statements made to the media are protected.161 These changes were 
needed, they said, because “[t]he right to petition government is crucial 
to our democracy. Citizens who exercise their right to petition 
government deserve strong protections from those who see litigation as a 
means to chill that fundamental right.”162 
Recognizing these and other limitations, the Washington Legislature 
in 2010 enacted a new statutory provision that significantly expanded the 
scope of anti-SLAPP protections.163 The statute is modeled after 
California’s anti-SLAPP statute164 and a model law suggested by the 
Society for Professional Journalists.165 Senator Adam Kline, the Chair of 
                                                   
155. Id. at 371–72, 85 P.3d at 930. 
156. See, e.g., PRING & CANAN, supra note 9, at 192–93; Johnston, supra note 90, at 284; 
Hartzler, supra note 43, at 1248–53; Newman & McGavik, supra note 90. 






163. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 921, 924. (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2010)). The prior law, WASH. REV. 
CODE § 4.24.510 (2010), was unchanged and remains in effect. 
164. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 2011). 
165. A Uniform Act Limiting Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation, SOC’Y PROF’L 
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the Senate Judiciary Committee who sponsored the bill, also 
incorporated suggestions from the Newman and McGavick article when 
the statute was being drafted.166 
Codified at RCW 4.24.525, the statute protects as a matter of 
substantive law any public statements and documents submitted to a 
public forum—and “any . . . lawful conduct in furtherance of the 
exercise of the constitutional right of free speech”—related to issues of 
public concern.167 The statute provides for special motions to strike, 
which operate as early motions for summary judgment that require 
SLAPP plaintiffs to demonstrate, at the outset of the litigation, that they 
can establish the required elements of their case with convincing 
clarity.168 A motion “may be filed within sixty days of the service of the 
most recent complaint or, in the court’s discretion, at any later time upon 
terms it deems proper.”169 Once a motion is filed, a hearing shall be held 
no later than thirty days after the motion is served “unless the docket 
conditions of the court require a later hearing.”170 To the extent that a 
court cannot hold the hearing within thirty days, “the court is directed to 
hold a hearing with all due speed and such hearings should receive 
priority.”171 A court must rule on the motion within seven days after the 
hearing is held.172 Discovery is stayed pending the decision, and the stay 
“shall remain in effect until the entry of the order ruling on the 
motion.”173 However, on motion and a finding of good cause shown, a 
court may order that discovery or other hearings or motions be 
                                                   
JOURNALISTS, http://www.spj.org/antislapp.asp#4 (last visited Apr. 23, 2012). The California statute 
and the SPJ Model Law are highly similar. Compare id., with CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16. The 
latter specifically references the California statute in its commentary. A Uniform Act Limiting 
Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation, supra. 
166. Email from Adam Kline, Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, to Rowland Thompson 
(Oct. 11, 2009, 10:21 PM) (on file with authors). 
167. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(e).  
168. Id. § 4.24.525(4). Because the statute protects speech on matters of public concern, it fits 
within Post’s requirements for the protection of academic freedom because he believes academic 
freedom should extend beyond simply matters of public concern. POST, supra note 4, at 81–85 
(considering the public concern test within the context of protecting academic freedom). 
169. § 4.24.525(5)(a). Because a “party” can bring a special motion to strike, the language is 
broad enough to allow a government entity or public employee to invoke immunity. This is another 
example of how the statute is more protective than RCW 4.24.010, which the Washington State 
Supreme Court has ruled cannot be used by government entities. See Segaline v. State, 169 Wash. 
2d 467, 473, 238 P.3d 1107, 1110 (2010). 
170.  § 4.24.525(5)(a). 
171. Id. 
172. Id. § 4.24.525(5)(b). 
173. Id. § 4.24.525(5)(c). 
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conducted.174 As with RCW 4.24.510, prevailing defendants may 
recover a $10,000 fine, reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and “[s]uch 
additional relief, including sanctions upon the responding party and its 
attorneys or law firms, as the court determines to be necessary to deter 
repetition of the conduct and comparable conduct by others similarly 
situated.”175 
Both parties may seek an expedited appeal if a court fails to promptly 
rule on a motion to dismiss.176 The statute’s express right of an 
immediate appeal is particularly important. The Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals recently distinguished between anti-SLAPP statutes that 
provide a right to an immediate appeal in state court, such as 
California’s, and those that do not expressly so provide, 177 such as 
Nevada’s current and Oregon’s former statute.178 In essence, the 
California statute provides immunity from being tried, while the Nevada 
and Oregon statutes provide only immunity from liability.179 The 
difference is subtle but significant. Under California’s law, a person has 
a right to an immediate appeal, which will stop the litigation from 
progressing while the case is on appeal; under the statutes of Nevada and 
Oregon, a person must seek a discretionary review but the litigation 
continues in the meantime.180 The Ninth Circuit pointed out that a 
litigant in federal court who invokes the Nevada or Oregon anti-SLAPP 
statutes may seek an interlocutory appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1292(b) or, in truly extraordinary cases, a writ of mandamus.181 A 
discretionary appeal is always problematic because the party incurs the 
cost of expensive and time-consuming briefing with no guarantee that 
the appeals court will accept the case. 
According to the accompanying legislative findings, RCW 4.24.525 is 
                                                   
174. Id. 
175. Id. § 4.24.525(6)(a). 
176. Id. § 4.24.525(5)(d). 
177. Metabolic Research, Inc. v. Ferrell, No. 10-16209, 2012 WL 400436, at *5 (9th Cir. Feb. 9, 
2012). The Ninth Circuit was interpreting Oregon’s statute before it was amended in 2009. See infra 
note 178 and accompanying text. 
178. NEV. REV. STAT. § 41.660 (2012); Oregon’s statute was changed in 2009 when lawmakers 
added the last sentence: “If the court denies a special motion to strike, the court shall enter a limited 
judgment denying the motion.” OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.150(1) (West Supp. 2011). In addition, 
lawmakers added a section to section 31.152, which states that a defendant is given “the right to not 
proceed to trial in cases in which the plaintiff does not meet the burden specified in ORS 
31.150 (3)” and that the statute must be liberally construed in favor of the exercise of the rights of 
expression. § 31.152(4). These amendments provide for an immediate appeal.  
179. Metabolic Research, 2012 WL 400436, at *5. 
180. Id. at *6. 
181. Id. 
11 -- Johnson FINAL.docx (Do Not Delete) 6/23/2012 8:18 AM 
520 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87:495 
 
to be construed liberally.182 In the findings, the legislature explained that 
it was concerned about claims “brought primarily to chill the valid 
exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for 
the redress of grievances.”183 Although SLAPP suits are typically 
dismissed, the litigation often is not resolved before “the defendants are 
put to great expense, harassment, and interruption of their productive 
activities.”184 Finally, lawmakers noted that “[i]t is in the public interest 
for citizens to participate in matters of public concern and provide 
information to public entities and other citizens on public issues that 
affect them without fear of reprisal through abuse of the judicial 
process.”185 
E. In the First Case to Apply RCW 4.24.525, Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog 
Films, Inc., the Washington State Supreme Court Interpreted the 
Statute Broadly and in Line with Legislative Intent 
The first case to interpret the new statute was Aronson v. Dog Eat 
Dog Films, Inc.186 There, a copyright owner filed an action against 
defendant, Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., claiming that the inclusion of his 
song and video in Michael Moore’s documentary film, Sicko,187 without 
the owner’s authorization, infringed the plaintiff’s exclusive copyright to 
his video and song.188 The lawsuit also alleged two state law claims: 
invasion of privacy for the alleged unauthorized distribution of the 
plaintiff’s home video, which gave publicity to a matter concerning the 
plaintiff’s private life, and misappropriation of likeness.189 
Dog Eat Dog Films brought a motion to strike the plaintiff’s two state 
law claims under RCW 4.24.525. Recognizing that this was a case of 
first impression, the court explained that analysis of a motion filed 
                                                   
182. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 921, 924 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525 (2010)). 
183. Id.; see also N.Y. Studio, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Alaska, Or., & W. Wash., No. 3:11-
cv-05012-RBL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62567, at *1 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2011) (“The 2010 
Revised Washington Anti-SLAPP Act was intended to address lawsuits brought primarily to chill 
the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of 
grievances.”). 
184. 2010 Wash. Sess. Laws at 924.  
185. Id. 
186. 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
187. Dog Eat Dog Films, a loan-out company owned by Michael Moore and his wife Kathleen 
Glynn, was incorrectly designated as defendant in this case. The company that produced Sicko, 
Goldflat Productions, LLC, owned by Michael Moore, was the proper defendant. Id. at 1108 n.1. 
188. Id. at 1108. 
189. Id. 
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pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute requires a two-step process.190 First, a 
defendant who files a motion must make a threshold showing that the 
complaint arises from protected activity.191 Second, if the defendant 
makes the showing, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show a 
probability of prevailing.192 The court held that Dog Eat Dog Films 
satisfied its initial burden.193 
Moreover, the statute allows a media defendant to file a special 
motion to strike.194 The court further explained that the statute is to be 
construed liberally toward its goal of protecting participants involved in 
public discourse “from an abusive use of the courts.”195 The court 
continued: 
Any conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional 
right of free speech in connection with an issue of public 
concern is subject to the protections of the statute. That 
Defendant may be considered a powerful business entity as 
compared with the private party Plaintiff is of no import under 
the modern framework of the statute. Nor is it critical that 
Plaintiff is not a public figure. Whereas a public figure, standing 
alone, may satisfy the public interest element of the Act, a 
private individual satisfies this requirement so long as there is a 
direct connection with the individual to a discussion of a topic of 
widespread public interest.196 
The court concluded that the plaintiff appeared in the documentary as a 
part of the film’s discussion of healthcare and therefore the film 
company had satisfied its threshold burden of showing that the 
complaint arose from Dog Eat Dog’s protected activity.197 
Turning to the plaintiff’s burden, the court ruled that the state law 
claims for misappropriation were barred by the First Amendment and 
that RCW 63.60.070198 provides an exemption to Washington’s statutory 
                                                   
190. Id. at 1110. 
191. Id. (citing Club Members for an Honest Election v. Sierra Club, 196 P.3d 1094, 1098 (Cal. 
2008); Dyer v. Childress, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 546–47 (Ct. App. 2007)). 
192. Id. (citing Zamos v. Stroud, 87 P.3d 802, 806 (Cal. 2004); Dyer, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 547). 
193. Id. at 1111 (citing Dyer, 55 Cal. Rptr. 3d 544, 547; M.G. v. Time Warner, Inc., 107 Cal. 
Rptr. 2d 504, 509 (Ct. App. 2001); Dora v. Frontline Video, Inc., 18 Cal. Rptr. 2d 790, 793–95 (Ct. 
App. 1993)). 
194. Id. (citing Braun v. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 61 Cal. Rptr. 2d 58, 61 (Ct. App. 1997)). 
195. Id. 
196. Id. (citing Four Navy Seals v. Associated Press, 413 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1149 (S.D. Cal. 
2005); Terry v. Davis Cmty. Church, 33 Cal. Rptr. 3d 145, 153–54 (Ct. App. 2005)). 
197. Id. at 1112. 
198. The statute provides that “[f]or purposes of RCW 63.60.050, the use of a name, voice, 
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cause of action for misappropriation.199 The court further ruled that the 
Copyright Act200 preempted plaintiff’s state law claims.201 Finally, the 
court ruled that the plaintiff had not shown by clear and convincing 
evidence a probability of prevailing on the merits of his invasion of 
privacy claim because Sicko disclosed no facts of intimate details of the 
plaintiff’s life that are highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable 
person.202 The court concluded that because Dog Eat Dog prevailed on 
its motion, it was entitled to the $10,000 statutory fine and its reasonable 
attorneys’ fees.203 
As the first case interpreting RCW 4.24.525, Aronson set a number of 
important precedents. First, the court enunciated the two-step burden 
shifting analysis, thereby setting clear guidance to subsequent courts on 
how to evaluate a motion to strike.204 Second, the court recognized that 
the anti-SLAPP statute must be construed liberally to effectuate its 
general purpose of protecting participants in public controversies from 
an abusive use of the courts.205 Third, the court did not hesitate to apply 
the statute to a media defendant, including a media defendant who might 
have more resources to fight a SLAPP claim, as compared with the 
citizens who fought the developers in Gilman and Right-Price 
Recreation.206 Fourth, the court did not limit use of the statute to 
traditional anti-SLAPP claims such as defamation or interference with 
business opportunities, but instead extended it to right of publicity 
claims207 and invasion of privacy.208 Fifth, the court recognized that 
“public concern” covered the broader topic in Sicko (health care in 
America) rather than the particular incident that the plaintiff complained 
about.209 Sixth, the court looked to California law in its interpretation of 
                                                   
signature, photograph, or likeness in connection with matters of cultural, historical, political, 
religious, educational, newsworthy, or public interest, including, without limitation, comment, 
criticism, satire, and parody relating thereto, shall not constitute a use for which consent is required 
under this chapter.” WASH. REV. CODE § 63.60.070 (2010). RCW 63.60.050 is Washington State’s 
right of publicity statute. 
199. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1114. 
200. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101–1332 (2006). 
201. Aronson, 738 F. Supp. 2d at 1116.  
202. Id. at 1117. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 1110. 
205. Id. 
206. Id. at 1111. 
207. Id. at 1114. 
208. Id. at 1116–17. 
209. Id. at 1110–12. 
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the statute.210 Subsequent decisions have also looked to California cases 
for guidance on interpreting the new statute.211 Reliance on California’s 
case law is important as courts interpret the new statute and establish 
precedents because California’s statute is one of the broadest anti-
SLAPP statutes in the United States212 and has generated a wealth of 
interpretive decisions. 
F. Recent Efforts to Challenge Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP Statute 
Are Unlikely to Succeed 
The anti-SLAPP statute is not without its critics. Some plaintiffs have 
argued that the statute is unconstitutional.213 At least one federal court in 
Washington has rejected the argument: “[T]he assertion that the Anti-
SLAPP Act is unconstitutional is questionable given that California’s 
Anti-SLAPP Act, which is substantially similar to Washington’s statute, 
has been litigated multiple times and not held unconstitutional.”214 
Plaintiffs who seek to argue that the statute is unconstitutional are 
unlikely to succeed because the challenging party bears the burden of 
showing that a statute is unconstitutional, and that burden is a high 
one.215 The Washington State Supreme Court has stated that “statutes are 
presumed constitutional and that a statute’s challenger has a heavy 
burden to overcome that presumption; the challenger must prove that the 
statute is unconstitutional beyond a reasonable doubt.”216 
[T]he “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard used when a statute 
is challenged as unconstitutional refers to the fact that one 
                                                   
210. Id. at 1110. 
211. See, e.g., Phillips v. Seattle Times Co., No. C11-561RSM, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 115753 
(W.D. Wash. Oct. 5, 2011) (citing the California anti-SLAPP statute); Phx. Trading, Inc. v. Kayser, 
No. C10-0920JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81432, at *20 (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2011) (applying 
California law); Castello v. City of Seattle, No. C10-1457MJP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127648, at 
*13–14 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2010). But see N.Y. Studio, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Alaska, 
Or., & W. Wash., No. 3:11-cv-05012-RBL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62567, at *9–10 (W.D. Wash. 
June 13, 2011) (declining to use California precedent based on a difference in language between 
WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(4)(b) (2010) and CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 425.16(b)(1) (West Supp. 
2011)). 
212. Hartzler, supra note 43, at 1262. 
213. See, e.g., Castello, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6438, at *13. 
214. Id. (citing Equilon Enters. v. Consumer Cause, Inc., 52 P.3d 685 (Cal. 2002)). 
215. See N.Y. State Club Ass’n v. City of New York, 487 U.S. 1, 17 (1988). 
216. Sch. Dists. Alliance for Adequate Funding of Special Educ. v. State, 170 Wash. 2d 599, 605, 
244 P.3d 1, 4 (2010) (citing Wash. Fed’n of State Emps. v. State, 127 Wash. 2d 544, 558, 901 P.2d 
1028 (1995)); see also Nunez v. City of San Diego, 114 F.3d 935, 944 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing City 
of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439–40 (1985)) (presuming that statutes are 
constitutional). 
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challenging a statute must, by argument and research, convince 
the court that there is no reasonable doubt that the statute 
violates the constitution. The reason for this high standard is 
based on our respect for the legislative branch of government as 
a co-equal branch of government, which, like the court, is sworn 
to uphold the constitution. . . . Additionally, the Legislature 
speaks for the people and we are hesitant to strike a duly enacted 
statute unless fully convinced, after a searching legal analysis, 
that the statute violates the constitution. 217 
Plaintiffs challenging the law particularly object to their burden of 
showing a prima facie case by clear and convincing evidence. By 
requiring clear and convincing proof of all elements of the plaintiff’s 
prima facie case in response to a dismissal motion, the legislature merely 
codified the common law of defamation from Mark v. Seattle Times,218 
where the Washington State Supreme Court held that “a defamation 
plaintiff resisting a defense motion for summary judgment must 
establish a prima facie case by evidence of convincing clarity.”219 Even 
if the statute did make a change to the existing case law, the Washington 
Legislature has the power to modify the common law220 as well as 
statutory rights and causes of action.221 
V. BROAD ANTI-SLAPP STATUTES SUPPORT POST’S 
THEORY OF PUBLIC DISCOURSE AND DEMOCRATIC 
LEGITIMATION 
RCW 4.24.525 provides immunity for, inter alia, an oral or written 
statement submitted “in a place open to the public or a public forum in 
connection with an issue of public concern” and “[a]ny other lawful 
conduct” that furthers the right of free speech “in connection with an 
issue of public concern, or in furtherance of the exercise of the 
                                                   
217. Sch. Dists. Alliance, 170 Wash. 2d at 605–06, 244 P.3d at 4 (alterations in orginal) (quoting 
Island Cnty. v. State, 135 Wash. 2d 141, 147, 955 P.2d 377 (1998)). 
218. 96 Wash. 2d 473, 635 P.2d 1081 (1981). 
219. Id. at 487, 635 P.2d at 1089. The Court noted that the policy reasons, based on the First 
Amendment, for an early review of a plaintiff’s evidence by a convincing clarity standard continue 
to be persuasive. Id. at 487, 635 P.2d at 1088; see also Herron v. KING Broad. Co., 112 Wash. 2d 
762, 768, 776 P.2d 98, 101 (1989). 
220. See Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Tobacco Growers’ Coop. Mktg. Ass’n, 276 U.S. 71, 
89 (1928) (“[T]he present controversy concerns a statute, and a state may freely alter, amend, or 
abolish the common law within its jurisdiction.”). 
221. See Sofie v. Fibreboard Corp., 112 Wash. 2d 636, 666, 771 P.2d 711, 727 (1989) (“It is 
entirely within the Legislature’s power to define parameters of a cause of action and prescribe 
factors to take into consideration in determining liability.”). 
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constitutional right of petition.”222 The statute does not define “public 
concern,” although lawmakers provided some guidance when they 
explained that “[i]t is in the public interest for citizens to participate in 
matters of public concern and provide information to public entities and 
other citizens on public issues that affect them without fear of reprisal 
through abuse of the judicial process.”223 The task of explaining what 
“public concern” means has been left to the courts. In Aronson, the 
federal court noted that “[t]he Washington Legislature has directed that 
the [anti-SLAPP] Act be applied and construed liberally.”224 Aronson set 
the tone, and several Washington courts in subsequent cases have 
broadly construed “public concern.” For instance, in Phoenix Trading, 
Inc. v. Kayser,225 the court applied the anti-SLAPP statute to statements 
about the quality of toothbrushes used in New York prisons.226 In New 
York Studio, Inc. v. Better Business Bureau of Alaska, Oregon and 
Western Washington,227 a court applied the statute to a Better Business 
Bureau press release about talent auditions.228 
A broad construction is consistent with court interpretations of 
“public concern” involving Washington cases that do not involve anti-
SLAPP claims. For example, the Washington Court of Appeals found 
that a dispute between two companies, though ostensibly private, 
nonetheless touched on a matter of public concern—software piracy—
requiring a libel plaintiff to prove a higher level of fault.229 The 
Washington State Supreme Court has found that “even the slightest tinge 
of public concern is sufficient” when deciding the level of protection 
afforded a public employee’s speech.230 
Because the statute is modeled, in part, on California’s statute, the 
cases from that state are instructive in interpretations of “public 
concern.” California courts have found that an “issue of public interest” 
                                                   
222. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(d), (e) (2010). 
223. Public Participation Lawsuits—Special Motion to Strike Claim, ch. 118, 2010 Wash. Sess. 
Laws 921, 924 (codified at WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525). 
224. Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1111 (W.D. Wash. 2010). 
225. No. C10-0920JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81432b (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2011). 
226. Id. at *5. 
227. No. 3:11-cv-05012-RBL, 2011 WL 2414452 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2011). 
228. Id. at *3. 
229. Alpine Indus. Computers, Inc. v. Cowles Publ’g Co., 114 Wash. App. 371, 393, 57 P.3d 
1178, 1190 (2002). 
230. White v. State, 131 Wash. 2d 1, 12 n.5, 929 P.2d 396, 404 (1997) (emphasis added) (quoting 
Binkley v. City of Tacoma, 114 Wash. 2d 373, 383 n.8, 787 P.2d 1366, 1373 (1990)) (finding that 
nurse’s internal report about patient’s abuse was of public concern for purposes of plaintiff’s claim 
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the First Amendment). 
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is “any issue in which the public is interested.”231 The court explained: 
“In other words, the issue need not be ‘significant’ to be protected by the 
anti-SLAPP statute—it is enough that it is one in which the public takes 
an interest.”232 
In our opinion, a broad anti-SLAPP statute is crucial to a democratic 
society. As Post explained, free speech advances the “goal of democratic 
legitimation by ensuring that public opinion remains open to the 
subjective engagement of all.”233 Washington’s new statute takes a 
tremendous leap toward this goal by providing new protections to a 
broad range of speech. As discussed above, the Washington State 
Supreme Court has found that “even the slightest tinge of public concern 
is sufficient” when deciding the level of protection afforded a public 
employee’s speech.234 It is difficult to imagine speech that is not 
covered. 
Reported decisions show that the statute has been effective and met 
its goals. One such goal is protecting citizens from retaliatory litigation. 
RCW 4.24.525 has been invoked successfully by government employees 
accused of defamation for statements made to the media,235 the Better 
Business Bureau for statements made in a press release,236 and a 
company writing letters to New York City officials.237 All of these 
defendants likely would not have been protected by RCW 4.24.510 
because their speech was not directed to a government entity. In 
addition, the new statute has achieved its goal of prompt resolution of 
meritless claims by significantly shortening the life of non-viable 
SLAPP claims from a matter of years to months.238 
Because our practices focus on defending the First Amendment, we 
                                                   
231. Nygård, Inc. v. Uusi-Kerttula, 72 Cal. Rptr. 3d 210, 220 (Ct. App. 2008) (emphasis in 
original). 
232. Id. 
233. POST, supra note 1, at 28. 
234. White, 131 Wash. 2d at 12 n.5, 787 P.2d at 404 n.5. 
235. Castello v. City of Seattle, No. C10-1457MJP, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127648, at *6–7 
(W.D. Wash. Nov. 22, 2010) (statements made to a television news station). 
236. N.Y. Studio, Inc. v. Better Bus. Bureau of Alaska, Or., & W. Wash., No. 3:11-cv-05012-
RBL, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 62567, at *2–3 (W.D. Wash. June 13, 2011). 
237. Phx. Trading, Inc. v. Kayser, No. C10-0920JLR, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81432 (W.D. 
Wash. July 25, 2011). 
238. The Castello lawsuit was filed in August 2010 and a court dismissed the claims in 
November 2010, some three months later. Castello, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 127648, at *7. Aronson 
was filed in April 2010 and dismissed in August 2010, four months later. Aronson v. Dog Eat Dog 
Films, Inc., 738 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1109 (W.D. Wash. 2010). Finally, the New York Studio claims 
were filed in January 2011 and dismissed in June 2011, five months later. N.Y. Studio, 2011 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 62567. 
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know the toll litigation takes on a person defending their right to speak 
out on and contribute to public opinion. If meritless lawsuits are 
dismissed early, the defendants are spared the cost and emotional toll of 
unnecessary litigation. Encouraging the prompt resolution of meritless 
defamation actions―whether it be through a special motion to strike 
under the anti-SLAPP statute, a Mark summary judgment motion,239 or a 
simple motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim―is the paramount 
goal, because the threat of litigation can have a chilling effect upon 
constitutionally protected free speech rights,240 rights that Dean Post so 
eloquently advocates for and endorses in his book. 
CONCLUSION 
Since 1989, Washington has struggled to provide appropriate 
safeguards to enable ordinary citizens to exercise “democratic 
competence” and to participate in “public discourse” without fear of 
pauperization by litigation, which are significant dangers posed by 
SLAPP plaintiffs: “Because of the cost that it entails, the threat of 
lengthy litigation becomes vital to a SLAPP’s effectiveness. Plaintiffs 
rarely win in court but often realize their ultimate goal: to devastate the 
defendant financially and chill the defendant’s public involvement.”241 
By focusing its protections on speech involving matters of public 
concern, RCW 4.24.525 directly fosters democratic legitimation. 
Furthermore, the law directly protects all “lawful conduct in furtherance 
of the exercise of the constitutional right of free speech in connection 
with an issue of public concern, or in furtherance of the exercise of the 
constitutional right of petition,”242 which is consistent with the “contours 
                                                   
239. See supra notes 218–219 and accompanying text. 
240. See Mark v. Seattle Times, 96 Wash. 2d 473, 484–85, 635 P.2d 1081, 1088 (1981) (“Serious 
problems regarding the exercise of free speech and free press guaranteed by the First Amendment 
are raised if unwarranted lawsuits are allowed to proceed to trial. The chilling effect of the pendency 
of such litigation can itself be sufficient to curtail the exercise of these freedoms.” (quoting Tait v. 
KING Broad. Co., 1 Wash. App. 250, 255, 460 P.2d 307 (1969))); see also Baker v. L.A. Herald 
Examiner, 721 P.2d 87, 96 (Cal. 1986); Barnett v. Denver Publ’g Co., 36 P.3d 145, 147 (Colo. App. 
2001); Andrews v. Stallings, 892 P.2d 611, 616 (N.M. Ct. App. 1995); cf. Franchise Realty 
Interstate Corp., v. S.F. Local Joint Exec. Bd., 542 F.2d 1076, 1082–83 (9th Cir. 1976) (“[W]here a 
plaintiff seeks damages or injunctive relief, or both, for conduct which is prima facie protected by 
the First Amendment, the danger that the mere pendency of the action will chill the exercise of First 
Amendment rights requires more specific allegations than would otherwise be required.”). 
241. Tom Wyrwich, Comment, A Cure for a “Public Concern”: Washington’s New Anti-SLAPP 
Law, 86 WASH. L. REV. 663, 666–67 (2011). 
242. WASH. REV. CODE § 4.24.525(2)(e) (2010). 
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of First Amendment coverage” advocated by Dean Post.243 Finally, by 
providing compensation to those defendants who have been sued for the 
exercise of their free speech rights but “lack resources to sufficiently 
participate in the formation of public opinion,” the new statute directly 
promotes Dean Post’s goal of securing “democratic legitimation in a 
modern culturally heterogeneous state.”244 Indeed, the right to participate 
in “public discourse” is promoted with a substantive immunity that we 
believe is equal to Dean Post’s constitutional goals and values. 
                                                   
243. POST, supra note 1, at 15. 
244. Id. at 18. 
